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THE VIRGINIA LAND TRUST-AN OVERLOOKED
TITLE HOLDING DEVICE FOR INVESTMENT,
BUSINESS AND ESTATE PLANNING PURPOSES
PETER A. ARNTSON*
Ten years ago, the General Assembly by statute validated the Illinois
Land Trust in Virginia.' As might be expected following the introduction
of any new method of holding title to real estate, it met with mixed
reactions. The land trust was welcomed by the banks and trust companies
which hoped that it would quickly become accepted as a method of
syndication.2 Almost immediately, possible legal problems were raised
which naturally hindered its growth; 3 probably as a result of the ques-
tions raised, the Virginia land trust has, during the first ten years of its
existence, failed to win the acceptance by real estate developers and inves-
tors that had been anticipated by its proponents.' With some planning,
however, and possibly later through statutory amendment, the problems
can be overcome or removed, and the Virginia land trust may serve the
purposes for which it was designed.
This type of trust might well be considered a "hybrid" since, in an
orthodox common-law realty trust, legal title is vested in the trustee and
*Partner, Phillips, Kendrick, Gearheart & Aylor, Arlington, Va.; B.A. 1960, J.D. 1965,
University of Virginia; LL.M. 1971, Georgetown University.
'VA. CODE ANN. § 55-17.1 (Repl. vol. 1969).
No trust relating to real estate shall fail nor shall any use relating to real
estate be defeated because no beneficiaries are specified by name in the
recorded deed of conveyance to the trustee or because no duties are im-
posed upon the trustee. The power conferred by any such instrument on a
trustee to sell, lease, encumber or otherwise dispose of property therein
described shall be effective and no person dealing with such a trustee shall
be required to make further inquiry as to the right of such trustee to act
nor shall he be required to inquire as to the disposition of any proceeds.
Nothing in this section shall be construed (1) to affect any right which a
creditor may otherwise have against a trustee or beneficiary, (2) to enlarge
upon the power of a corporation to act as trustee under § 6, 9 [§ 6.1-5]
or (3) to affect the rule against perpetuities.
Id. The land trust under § 55-17.1 should not be confused with Real Estate Investment
Trusts, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-343-51 (Repl. vol. 1966), more commonly referred to as
REITs. See footnote 90 infra.
2See Schwind, Land Trusts: A Real Estate Syndication Device, 101 TRUST & ESTATES
650 (1962).
3See Continuing Legal Education Committee of the Bar Association of the City of
Richmond, Real Estate Syndications, Sept. 21, 1962, at 7.
4Letter from William B. Jacobs, Senior Vice President and Senior Trust Officer, The
Central National Bank, Richmond, Virginia, April 21, 1971; Survey of 82 Bank Trust
Departments in Virginia during May, 1971, conducted by James E. Rainey, Assistant Trust
Officer, United Virginia Bank/Seaboard National, Suffolk, Virginia, May 17, 1971.
74 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
equitable title is held by the beneficiaries. Presumably in a land trust the
complete title is vested in the trustee; the beneficial interest is personalty,
and full power of management and control is retained by the beneficiar-
ies. A land trust is a device utilized for holding and disposing of real
estate. Briefly, it consists of two documents: a deed in trust which is
recorded, and a trust agreement executed by the beneficiaries and trustee
which is not recorded. A brief general description of these two instru-
ments might be helpful.
Trust Agreement
The trust is created by an agreement executed by the trustee and
beneficiaries which defines the relationship between the parties; it states
that the trustee has or is about to receive title to certain designated real
property which it will hold in trust for the named beneficiaries according
to their respective interests. The important features of the agreement are
that the interest of the beneficiaries consists solely of the power of direc-
tion (1) to convey or otherwise deal with the title to the trust property,
(2) to manage and control the property and (3) to receive the proceeds
and avails from the rental, sale, mortgage or other disposition of the
property. The agreement provides, in addition, that the beneficiaries'
interests shall be personal property and may be assigned and transferred
as such, and that no beneficiary has any legal or equitable title in the trust
res. Further, the agreement generally provides that the beneficiaries re-
serve the right to amend or revoke the trust agreement; it should also
cover the resignation or removal of the trustee and the appointment of a
successor. Under the agreement the trustee is to execute all instruments
affecting the title to the trust property when directed to do so by the
beneficiaries or such persons as shall be designated in writing by the
beneficiaries. The trustee is required to sell all of the real estate then
remaining at the end of a fixed period of time, usually twenty years. As
a protection to the trustee, the agreement usually stipulates that no bene-
ficiary shall have the authority to contract for or in the name of the
trustee or to bind the trustee personally. Finally, the agreement provides
that it is not to be recorded but, if it is, that the recordation shall not be
notice in derogation of the trustee's title or powers.
Deed in Trust
The beneficiaries then convey, or cause to be conveyed to the trustee,
title to the specified real estate by a deed in trust. Generally, the instru-
ment grants the trustee for the uses and purposes set forth in the deed in
trust agreement full powers to improve, manage, contract, sell, convey,
mortgage, pledge and lease the real estate. In addition, it grants further
assurance that any person dealing with the trustee in relation to the
property shall not be obliged to see to the application of any funds or to
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inquire into the necessity or propriety of the trustee's act. The interest of
the beneficiaries and of all persons claiming under them is stated to be
only in the earnings, avails and proceeds arising from the sale or disposi-
tion of the real estate and is declared to be personal property. Therefore,
so far as the public land records are concerned, the trustee's powers are
complete.5
1. Brief History
The "land trust" originated in Illinois and is commonly referred to
as the "Illinois Land Trust." The Massachusetts Business Trust' appar-
ently served as the inspiration for the land trust, one of the earliest of
which was created in Chicago in 1891.1 The first court decision involving
a land trust appeared in 1920.8 The deed in trust and trust agreement
there involved were substantially the same as those presently in use in
Illinois, and the court upheld the basic theory of the land trust. The land
trust is a common device for holding title to real estate in Chicago and
the areas surrounding Cook County. It is known but not widely used in
downstate Illinois. Its growth in other states9 has been slow and without
the aid of statute changing certain common law concepts it has encoun-
tered problems. 0 These difficulties were overcome by legislation in Flor-
ida in 1963. 1 In 1967, North Dakota adopted a land trust statute modeled
after the Virginia statute,12 and there has been evidence of increasing
5Suggested land trust forms may be obtained from the trust department of the Central
National Bank of Richmond; standard forms are also published in the pamphlet, GARRETT,
LAND TRUSTS, which may be obtained from Chicago Title and Trust Company.
'Real Estate Trusts grew popular in Massachusetts in the latter part of the nineteenth
century when the state law prohibited a corporation from dealing in and developing real
estate. See Comment, Massachusetts Trusts, 37 YALE L.J. 1103, 1105 (1928). This is
probably the reason for the early growth of land trusts in Illinois since prior to 1933 the
corporate laws of that state, ILL. REV. STAT. § 157.7 (Smith-Hurd 1954), provided that a
corporation could not hold real estate except for corporate purposes. Turner, Some Legal
Aspects of Beneficial Interests Under Illinois Land Trusts, 39 ILL. L. REV. 216, 220 (1945)
(hereinafter cited as Turner).
7One of the first such trusts appears to have been created in that year. The trustee was
Cook County Abstract & Trust Company, one of the predecessors of Chicago Title & Trust
Company, which has been quite active in this field. Garrett, Land Trusts, 1955 U. ILL. L.F.
655, 657 (hereinafter cited as Garrett).
'Kerr v. Kotz, 218 IIl. App. 654 (1920), aftd, 299 11. 465, 132 N.E. 625 (1921).
'McKillop, The Illinois Land Trust in Florida, 13 U. FLA. L. REV. 173 (1960).
"Elvins v. Seestedt, 141 Fla. 266, 193 So. 54 (1940); Janura v. Fend, 261 Wis. 179, 52
N.W.2d 144 (1952) (passive trusts executed by Statute of Uses); Resnick v. Goldman, 133
So. 2d 770 (Fla. App. 1961) (marketability of trustee's title).
"FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.071 (1969); Note, Land Trust Act, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 699
(1964).
"2N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-03-02 (Supp. 1971); Note, The North Dakota Land Trust,
45 N.D.L. REv. 77 (1968).
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interest in land trusts in several other states.13
Possibly one reason for the willingness of early purchasers in Illinois
to take title to property from land trust trustees may have been that the
pioneers in land trust use, as evidenced by a review of the cases involving
land trusts, appear to have been abstract and title insurance companies.
These organizations would have been willing to insure their own titles.
While there have been no reported cases in Virginia regarding its own
land trust statute, there are numerous decisions in Illinois and some in
Florida which would undoubtedly be given due consideration by Virginia
courts. In general, the laws of trusts, personal property and contracts are
available to chart the probable reaction of the courts as to a specific
problem that might arise under a land trust.
2. Characteristics and Advantages of Land Trusts
The characteristics of land trusts, at least as they have been construed
by the courts of Illinois and Florida, are such as would normally be
expected to result in their use by investors, and in estate and business
planning as a means for holding title to real estate. For example, where
ownership of land is shared by several persons, there is necessarily a
complexity in dealing with the title to the property. For conveyances, the
signatures of each owner and spouse must be obtained; this burden is
increased where some of the owners reside at some distance or in other
states. The problems become increasingly complicated or impossible if
one or more of the owners should become incompetent, die, become
bankrupt or if a judgment is obtained against him. If a land trust is used
the trustee alone executes the instruments, regardless of how numerous
its beneficiaries or how complicated the affairs of one single beneficiary.
A grantee of the real estate does not have to be concerned about the
beneficiaries, and the real estate held in trust is immune from the prob-
lems which may arise from the affairs of the beneficiaries. If properly
drafted the trust will not be treated as an association taxable as a corpora-
tion subject to federal corporate income tax, and State and local real
estate recording taxes may be minimized. Since the real estate is held by
the trustee with he power to sell it at any time and with the mandatory
direction to sell at the end of a period not usually exceeding twenty years,
the courts in Illinois have repeatedly held that an equitable conversion
"3Carlock, The Sub-division Trust-A Useful Device in Real Estate Transactions, 5
ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1963); DeWitt, The Illinois Land Trust-Its Undeveloped Potential in
California, 41 Los ANGELES BAR BULL. 20 (1965); Note, The Illinois Land Trust and
Nebraska Law, 47 NEB. L. REV. 101 (1968); Note, Land Trusts in New York, 37 ST. JOHNS
L. REV. 123 (1962); Comment, Land Trusts-Adaptability to Kansas Real Estate Practice,




occurs at the time of the establishment of the trust," and the beneficial
interests therefore are considered to be personal peroperty.15 This same
result has been reached on the basis of the express stipulation of the
parties in the trust agreement.16
Assuming, as has been determined by the courts in Illinois and by
statute in Florida, that the beneficiaries' interest is personalty, no benefi-
ciaries' spouse would be entitled to dower or curtesy in the land; 7 the land
would not be subject to the personal debts of the beneficiaries," nor could
one or more of the beneficiaries or a creditor maintain an action for
partition."8 Further, since only the deed in trust is recorded and the Vir-
ginia statute specifically provides that it is not necessary to set forth the
names of the beneficiaries in the recorded trust instrument, the identity
of the beneficiaries may remain undisclosed;"0 anonymity may be impor-
tant in the assembly of a trust of land. Also through the trust agreement,
the beneficiaries may provide for the succession of ownership of their
beneficial interests at their death thereby eliminating such beneficial in-
terests as parts of their probate estates. Such a transfer by inter vivos
trust is not testamentary.2' Inheritance taxes, although regarded as a lien
against all property of which a decedent dies seized or possessed, would
not be a lien upon the real estate;2 2 moreover, the possibility of the pro-
bate of a later will within one year of date of death would not affect the
title of a purchaser from the land trustee since the decedent's beneficial
interest in the trust is personalty and not real estate.2? An obvious prob-
lem when non-residents own real estate or interests therein is that upon
death ancillary probate, and possibly administration, may be necessary
in order to pass title to the land. If title to the property is held in a land
trust, however, then presumably the beneficial interest of the beneficiary
will be treated as personal property. Consequently, the need for ancillary
proceedings with its delays will be removed, at least with respect to that
asset.
24
"McClanachan v. Siter, Price & Co., 2 Gratt. 280, 43 Va. 366 (1845).
'"Breen v. Breen, 411 Ill. 206, 103 N.E.2d 625 (1952); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v.
Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank, 300 Il1. App. 329, 20 N.E.2d 992 (1939). See also McKillop,
The Illinois Land Trust in Florida, 13 U. FLA. L. REV. 173, 186 (1960).
"Horney v. Hayes, 11 Ill. 2d 178, 142 N.E.2d 94 (1957); Aronson v. Olsen, 348 Ill.
26, 180 N.E. 565 (1932); Duncanson v. Lill, 322 Ill. 528, 153 N.E. 618 (1926).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19 (Repl. vol. 1968).
"Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank, 300 Ill. App. 329, 20
N.E.2d 992 (1939).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 8-690 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
2VA. CODE ANN. § 55-17.1 (Repl. vol. 1969).
"See Russell's Ex'rs v. Passmore, 127 Va. 475, 103 S.E. 652 (1920); Bear v. Milliken
Trust Co., 336 I1. 366, 168 N.E. 349 (1929).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 58-180 (Repl. vol. 1969).
2VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-95, 96 (Repl. vol. 1968).
"As to the advantages of using the land trust, as well as discussions of most of the
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3. Problems Restricting the Growth of Land Trusts
Despite its many apparent advantages, the land trust has developed
and flourished only in Illinois until recently, when its use spread by
statute to Florida, North Dakota and Virginia.
Application of Statute of Uses
One of the major obstacles to the use of the land trust has been the
effect of the English Statute of Uses.2 Since 1545 the Statute has been
held to be inapplicable to an active use or trust;26 howevever, its effect
upon a passive trust is to vest the legal title in the holder of the beneficial
interest. Therefore, in many states, the utilization of a land trust depends
upon whether the duties of the trustee are sufficiently active under the
local decisions to prevent the application of the Statute. Illinois has the
Statute,2 however the courts there have taken a liberal attitude towards
its operation holding that the duty imposed upon the trustee to sell the
trust property at the end of a period of years is sufficiently active to
remove the trust from the operation of the Statute.2 While there are
decisions to the contrary,2 9 the majority view is that a duty conferred upon
the trustee to convey, with nothing more, is sufficient to take the trust
out of the Statute.3  Any lingering doubt as to the application of the
Virginia Statute of Uses to the land trust was specifically removed by the
enactment of Section 55-17.1 .31
characteristics mentioned above, see Garrett, supra note 7; Turner, supra note 6; see also
the articles listed at note 13 supra.
21Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. VIII ch. 10 (1535).
26In general, see I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.16 et seq. (A.J. Casner ed. 1952);
2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §§ 266-268 (1971).
nBreen v. Breen, 411 111. 206, 103 N.E.2d 625 (1952).
2Crow v. Crow, 348 I11. 241, 180 N.E. 877 (1932); for a thorough discussion see
Chicago Title & Trust Company v. Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank, 300 Ill. App. 329, 20
N.E.2d 992 (1939).
2 Janura v. Fencl, 261 Wis. 179, 52 N.W.2d 144 (1952); Elvins v. Seestedt, 141 Fla.
266, 193 So. 54 (1940).
1°RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 69 (1959).
"'The English Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. VIII ch. 10 (1535), was repealed by the
Virginia General Assembly in 1792; in 1819, Virginia adopted a Limited Statute of Uses
which executes only declarations of trust wherever there are no duties imposed upon the
Trustee. Under the Statute of Uses where the trust beneficiaries have the whole beneficial
use and management of a trust estate and the trustee has no active duty to perform, the
trust will fail and full title passes to the beneficiaries. Sims v. Sims, 94 Va. 580, 27 S.E.
436 (1897). Although not having to decide the issue, the court in Jones v. Tatum, 19 Gratt.
720, 734, 60 Va. 260, 265 (1870) indicated that where the sole duty of the trustee was to
convey land to children upon the death of their mother, that while the English Statute would
transfer title in that situation, that it was doubtful whether the Virginia Statute would have
the same result. See also Blake v. O'Neal, 63 W. Va. 483, 61 S.E. 410 (1908). Since a land




One problem which impeded the use of the land trust in Florida
concerned the marketability of the title conveyed by the trustee. The law
of trusts adheres to a bona fide purchaser rule.3 The normal, recorded
deed in trust portion of the land trust, while making reference to the trust
agreement which is not recorded, grants to the trustee full power of sale.
Further recitals in the deed of trust generally assure that anyone deriving
title from the trustee need not inquire either into the trustee's authority
to act or into the disposition of the proceeds. In Illinois these recitals have
been considered sufficient to vest marketable title in the trustee and the
trustee's title is insurable as such. In Florida, however, a trustee's title
derived under a deed in trust containing all of the applicable recitals was
held not to be marketable because the trust agreement was neither re-
corded nor offered for inspection; therefore, the purchaser had no way
of knowing whether the trustee had acted within his authority.3 This
problem was eliminated in Florida by a statute which is specifically reme-
dial in nature and which has subsequently been favorably construed.
34
Section 55-17.1 of the Virginia Code assures the marketability of the land
trust trustee's title by providing that:
The power conferred by any such instrument [trust relating to real
estate] on a Trustee to sell, lease, encumber or otherwise dispose
of property therein described shall be effective and no person deal-
ing with such Trustee shall be required to make further inquiry as
to the right of such Trustee to act nor shall he be required to
inquire as to the disposition of any proceeds.
The statute also reaffirms the Virginia position that a trust is not neces-
sarily void for indefiniteness solely because the recorded deed in trust
does not list the beneficiaries by name.
35
Statute of Uses. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-17 (Repl. vol. 1969); Note, Land Trust: Some
Problems in Virginia, 7 WM. & MARY L. REV. 368 (1966).
11G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 881-97 (2d ed. 1962). The bona fide pur-
chaser rule provides that if a purchaser acquires for value a legal interest in property without
notice of an outstanding trust or other equitable interest, he may hold it free from the
equitable interest.
3Resnick v. Goldman, 133 So. 2d 770 (Fla. App. 1961).
3FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.071 (1969); Grammer v. Roman, 174 So. 2d 433 (Fla. App.
1965); Ferraro v. Parker, 229 So. 2d 621 (Fla. App. 1969).
"An identifiable beneficiary is essential to the existence of a private trust, otherwise
there is no one in a position to enforce the trust. And since Virginia has never adopted the
seventh section of the English Statute of Frauds, Jackson v. Greenhow, 155 Va. 758, 764,
156 S.E. 377, 379 (1931), the Virginia Courts have consistently held that an express trust
in real estate may be created and established by parol evidence. The declaration must be
unequivocal and explicit, and the evidence clear and convincing, Young v. Holland, 117 Va.
433, 84 S.E. 637 (1915); and where the recorded deed in trust did not name the beneficiaries,
1973]
80 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Beneficial Interest-Realty or Personalty
Almost all of the advantages to be realized from the utilization of a
land trust are based upon the premise that the interest of the beneficiaries
in the trust property is personalty and not realty. In Illinois there can be
no question that such is the result.
The rule has been long and well established in this state that the
form of deed and trust agreement before us creates .a valid and
subsisting trust under which the interest of the beneficiary is per-
sonal property only and not real estate. 6
The Illinois courts sometimes find that the relationship of the beneficiar-
ies under the agreement is one of partnership and consequently that the
partner's interest in the partnership realty held for profit is one of person-
alty." Often the court fails to state the theory upon which its decision is
based and merely recites the provision of the trust agreement that the
beneficial interest is personalty."s The decisions place great emphasis
upon the fact that the parties have agreed and stipulated among them-
selves that there interests shall be personalty. The question whether realty
can be converted to personalty by mere agreement does not appear to be
discussed. Notwithstanding this liberal view there would seem to be some
doubt whether conversion, at least with respect to third parties, can be
accomplished by agreement alone if the courts refuse to apply the doc-
trine of equitable conversion, or if the deed in trust does not include a
direction to the trustee to sell at the end of a specific period of time. 9 A
few of the land trust decisions refer directly to the doctrine of equitable
conversion. 0 Many of the earlier Illinois cases cited in the land trust
decisions involved testamentary trusts which directed the trustee to sell
the trust property consisting of real estate and to distribute the proceeds
among designated beneficiaries after termination of an intervening life
estate." While the doctrine is well recognized in Virginia," the question
as is the situation in a land trust, parol evidence has been held to be admissible for the
purpose of clarifying their identity. Virginia Trust Co. v. Minar, 179 Va. 377, 18 S.E.2d
879 (1942). All of the major title insurance companies have indicated their willingness to
issue policies on land trust titles.
3 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Say. Bank, 300 Ill. App. 329, 336,
20 N.E.2d 992, 995 (1939).
"I1d.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 50-26 (Repl. vol. 1972).
"See cases cited at note 16 supra.
"'See 2 G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 250 (1953).
"0Aronson v. Olsen, 248 Ill. 26, 180 N.E. 565 (1932); Breen v. Breen, 411 111. 206, 103
N.E.2d 625 (1952).
"Lash v. Lash, 209 Ill. 595, 70 N.E. 1049 (1904); Moll v. Gardner, 214 Ill. 248, 73
N.E. 442 (1905); see 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1162 (5th ed. 1941).
2See generally McClanachan v. Siter, Price & Co., 2 Gratt. 280, 43 Va. 366 (1845);
Sager and Lutens, Equity Conversion and the Virginia Decedent, 42 VA. L. REv. 409 (1956).
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remains as to whether the conversion will be deemed to occur at the time
of the instrument's execution or at the time of sale.
43
Florida has eliminated all question of the nature of the beneficial
interest by providing that if the recorded instrument states that the benefi-
cial interests are to be personal property that such provision shall control
for all purposes." It is submitted that in adopting land trust statutes the
legislatures of Virginia and North Dakota also embraced the land trust
as a convenient method of holding title to real estate; these statutes,
however, are only half-measures when compared to the Florida statute
which attacked the problem head-on. The Florida legislature provided the
attorney with the certainty which large investments in real estate demand.
In Virginia, unless this question is removed by legislation, it would appear
that the growth of the land trust as a means of holding title to real estate
shall remain very slow at least until the question is finally determined by
litigation.
Application of the Rule Against Perpetuities
One restriction upon the utilization of the land trust is that in practice
its duration has become limited to not more than twenty years while the
economic life of a modern city business building, apartment, shopping
center, etc. may be over forty years. This limitation is generally based
upon the erroneous belief that the duration of all private trusts must be
restricted to a period not in excess of the Rule Against Perpetuities.45 The
rule, however, should constitute no obstacle to the use of land trusts
extending beyond twenty years since the rule does not apply to "vested"
interests." In fact the rule requires only that the interest must "vest" not
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest." Therefore, if the deed in trust, which is recorded, specifies that
all of the beneficial interests are "vested" then the rule would not apply,
4Baker v. Commissioner, 353 Mass. 130, 148 N.E. 593 (1925). In Harcum's Adm'r
v. Hudnall, 14 Gratt. 369, 55 Va. 508 (1858), the court in dicta stated that equitable
conversion might not take place until the happening of a contingent event even though the
direction to sell the land at some time was absolute.
"FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.071(4) (1969).
In all cases where said recorded instrument as hereinabove provided, con-
tains a provision defining and declaring the interest of beneficiaries there-
under to be personal property only, such provision shall be controlling
for all purposes where such determination shall become an issue under the
laws or in the courts of this state.
Id.
"Comment, The Illinois Land Trust and Nebraska Law, 47 NEB. L. REv. 101, 109
(1968); Note, The North Dakota Land Trust, 45 N.D.L. REv. 77, 85, n.66 (1968).
"Evans v. Walker, 3 Ch. D. 211 (1876); see generally Hatfield, Perpetuities in Land
Trusts, 40 ILL. L. REv. 84 (1945).
j. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUTITIES § 201 (3d ed. 1915).
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the period would never begin to run, and no specific date, or at least no
date within twenty years or less, would have to be set forth in the deed.
At present at least two reasons remain for including a direction to the
trustee to sell at the end of a specified period. In Illinois, where the
existence of land trusts rests upon favorable court decisions, such direc-
tion remains necessary so that the trust will not be passive and thereby
executed by the Statute of Uses." The second reason for such direction
lies in the present reliance upon the doctrine of equitable conversion to
convert the beneficiaries' interest from realty to personalty. 9
It should be noted that though the period is included, the deed in trust
may be amended to extend the period. Furthermore, the deed in trust as
well as the trust agreement may authorize the trustee to enter into leases
or other contracts which extend beyond the date stated in the deed in
trust.
4. Other Frequently Utilized Methods of Holding Title
Because of the many problems involved when title to real estate is held
by more than one individual, investors generally turn to various forms of
syndication such as corporations and cooperatives, general partnerships
and joint ventures, limited partnerships and real estate investment
trusts.5" While each of the above methods of syndication may be appropri-
ate under certain circumstances, it is suggested that an alternative device
which so far has been used only sparingly in Virginia is the land trust.
The question as to whether real estate should be owned by a corporation
or directly by the interested individuals in some noncorporate form is
usually answered by comparing the federal income tax consequences
under each type of ownership.
Corporations
A corporation provides an easy method of holding title to real estate.
It is a traditional vehicle, familiar to lawyers, bankers, realtors and inves-
tors; it provides continuity of ownership and easy transferability of inter-
ests in the entity holding the real estate through sale or transfer of shares
of stock in the corporation. Federal corporate income tax provisions,
"As has previously been stated, this problem has been eliminated in Virginia as well
as Florida and North Dakota by statute.
"In Illinois, the conversion has also been based upon the express agreement of the
beneficiaries as well as the finding that their relationship was one of partners. The need to
rely upon the doctrine has been eliminated by statute in Florida. See note 44 supra.
"As used in real estate operations, the term "syndication" means a group of partici-
pants consisting of either individuals, corporations, partnerships or trusts, or combinations
of these, who have joined together in acquiring and holding title to real estate or an interest
in it. 83 C.J.S. Syndicate 933 (1953); see also Ashworth v. Hagan Estates, 165 Va. 151,
154, 181 S.E. 381, 382 (1935).
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however, cause tax problems which in general overshadow the corporate
advantages. There is the problem of income tax at the corporate level,5
and the corporation may be subject to personal holding company tax5
or, in the alternative, the accumulated earnings tax. 3 If the real estate
is rental property the corporation may not be eligible to elect to be taxed
pursuant to Sub-Chapter S.51 Further, if the property is held for invest-
ment there is always the danger that in the event of a possible sale of the
property followed by liquidation, or even the sale or exchange of the stock
of the corporation, it might be treated as a collapsible corporation for
federal corporate income tax purposes. In that case the gain realized
would be considered as gain from the sale or exchange of a non-capital
asset.
A corporation is generally recognized as an entity separate from its
stockholders for business purposes; this is also the general rule for federal
income tax purposes. 6 There is a line of cases, however, which hold that
where there is no real business purpose, and the purpose of the corpora-
tion is the mere holding of title to real estate for the convenience of
stockholders or for other personal reasons, the corporate entity may be
disregarded for federal income tax purposes." Many decisions ignore the
corporate entity where a "dummy" real estate corporation is utilized.,
Even where a corporation may be a mere dummy for most purposes,
however, if it engages in any slight business activity such as borrowing
money, executing mortgages or making leases, such activity may be suffi-
cient to balance the scales in favor of recognition of the corporate entity.55
The adoption of by-laws, holding meetings, electing officers and direc-





51Dalton v. Bowers, 287 U.S. 404 (1932); Groves v. Commissioner, 99 F.2d 179 (4th
Cir. 1938).
5"Brager Bldg. & Land Corp. v. United States, 124 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1941); John A.
Mulligan, 16 T.C. 1489 (1951); Thomas K. Glenn, 3 T.C. 328 (1944); Thomas C. Wilwerth,
24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 825 (1955).
-"Carling Holding Co., 41 B.T.A. 493 (1940); Abrams Sons' Realty Corp., 40 B.T.A.
653 (1939); Stewart Forshay, 20 B.T.A. 537 (1930), nonacquiesced in, 1931 Cum. Bull. 79;
Richmond D. Moot, T.C. Mem. Op. Dkt. 105520 (1942).
5'Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943); Higgins v. Smith, 308
U.S. 473 (1940); Tomlinson v. Miles, 316 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1963); Commissioner v. State-
Adams Corp., 283 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1960), rev'g 32 T.C. 365 (1959), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
844 (1961); Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1945); Love v. United States,
96 F. Supp. 919 (Ct. Cl. 1951); G. Loutrell Timanus, 32 T.C. 631 (1959), affd, 278 F.2d
297 (4th Cir. 1960); Garden State Developers, Inc., 30 T.C. 135 (1958); Albob Holding
Corp., 28 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 185 (1959); Abraham J. Halparin, 11 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
254 (1945), affd per curiam, 154 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1946).
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tors, and issuing stock and other securities, though necessary steps in
preparation for the carrying on of business activities, are merely formal
acts of organization and are not substantive income producing activities."
But the carrying on of actual business in addition to serving the personal
convenience of the shareholders will result in the corporation remaining
a separate taxable entity; and the rule is not changed merely by the fact
that the transferors of the property own all of the stock of the corpora-
tion.6' Where there is any uncertainty or fault in the documentation or in
the actual operation of the corporation it is deemed to be the owner of
the property." Therefore, from the standpoint of possible Federal income
tax liability, it is unwise to utilize a "dummy" real estate corporation to
acquire property if such ownership will require or involve business activity
on the part of the corporation.1
3
Most of the tax cases have been based upon the theory that the
corporation acted as agent for the beneficial owners, and the same result
has also been reached upon the basis that the title holding corporation
was acting as trustee." Real estate in Virginia, however, should not be
transferred to a corporation as a trustee since the only corporations
authorized to act as trustee are banks and trust companies organized
under the laws of Virginia and national banks located within the state."
A corporation cannot serve as a convenient means of holding title to
the real estate for a changing group of investors since for income tax
purposes each new investor will have purchased stock and have a new
basis for his stock, equal to its cost.6 This basis, however, is not attributa-
ble to the real estate unless the purchase is soon followed by a liquidation
so that it is clear that the Kimbell-Diamond or asset purchase rule ap-
plies. 7 The judicial Kimbell-Diamond rule, as opposed to the statutory
10Aldon Homes, Inc., 33 T.C. 582 (1959); Shaw Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.
1102 (1961), affd, 323 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1963).
"Harry F. Shannon, 29 T.C. 702 (1958).
"2O'Neill v. Commissioner, 170 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1948).
13Dodd v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1962). See generally Katz and Kapp,
Taxability of Straw Corporations in Real Estate Transactions, 22 TAX LAW 647 (1969).
"See, e.g., Fellows Sales Co. v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 347 (S.D.S.D. 1961). As
a general rule, an agent does not ordinarily have title to the property of its principal while
a trustee does have title. Handy v. C.I.T. Corp., 291 Mass. 157, 197 N.E. 64 (1935). Where
a person undertakes to act on behalf of another, subject to the other's control, he becomes
an agent. If he is also vested with the title to the property, he is a trustee. Brown v.
Christman, 126 F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1942). In such a situation, the agency relation predomi-
nates, and the principles of agency rather than the principles of trust are applicable. As to
the distinction between trustees and agents see A. Scorr, TRUSTS § 8 (1967). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 8, Comments a and h (1959).
'5See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-4 and 6.1-16 (Repl. vol. 1966).
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1012.
TKimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), affdper curiam,
187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951). See generally Lewis, Cost of Stock Basis for Assets Received
from Acquired Corporations, 19 U. MIAMI L. REV. 159 (1964).
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rule under section 334(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code which is applic-
able solely to corporate purchasers, applies only where- there was an
intention on the part of the purchasers at the time the stock was acquired
to liquidate the corporation."
Joint Ventures, Partnerships and Limited Partnerships
Other forms of legal arrangements frequently utilized for real estate
syndications are joint ventures, general partnerships and limited partner-
ships. In general a joint venture is treated both for tax purposes69 as well
as otherwise as a partnership.70 By statute the legal nature of a partner's
interest in the partnership is personalty; 71 partnership realty therefore is
not subject to dower, curtesy or allowances to widows, heirs or next of
kin.7 1 While legal title to realty may be held and transferred by a partner-
ship,71 a partnership is not a separate legal entity74 from the particular
group of persons whose association together constitutes its existence.
7
1
The partnership of A, B and C, is different from the partnership of A, B
"Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1938); Distributors
Fin. Corp. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 768 (1953); H.B. Snively, 19 T.C. 850 (1953) (individ-
ual purchaser); Ruth M. Cullen, 14 T.C. 368 (1950), acquiesed in, 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 1
(individual purchaser).
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 761(a).
lOWiley N. Jackson Co. v. Norfolk, 197 Va. 62, 87 S.E.2d 781 (1955).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 50-26 (Repl. vol. 1972).
72VA. CODE ANN. § 50-25(e) (Repl. vol. 1972).
"At common-law a partnership was not considered a legal entity for the purpose of
holding title to real estate. Legal title was in the partners regardless of whether the deed
was taken in their own names, or in the names of one or more of them, or in the name of
the partnership. Deeds to partnership realty therefore had to.be executed by each partner
and their spouses were required to join in order to convey dower, curtesy and homestead.
Upon the death of a partner his interest in the partnership realty passed to his heirs subject
to the equitable rights of the creditors of the partnership. And upon dissolution of the
partnership, the former partners became simply tenants in common as to realty. See gener-
ally 7 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 3221 (Repl. vol. 1962). The Uniform Partnership
Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1 to 43 (Repl. vol. 1972), adopted by Virginia in 1918 gives a
partnership sufficient aura of a legal entity to enable it to acquire, own, hold and transfer
real estate in its own right. Title to realty may be held in the name of the partnership, in
the names of one or more of the partners, or in the name of all of the partners. Id. § 50-
10. Property acquired in the partnership name, however, may be conveyed only in the
partnership name. 7 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 3222 (Repl. vol. 1962).
7The Partnership Act as originally drafted would have treated the partnership as an
entity. See Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to Mr. Carne's Criticism, 29
HARV. L. REV. 158 (1915). When finally drafted and approved, however, the completed Act
was based on the aggregate theory as at common-law. J. BARRETT & E. SEAGO, PARTNERS
AND PARTNERSHIPS: LAW AND TAXATION at 154 (1956) (hereinafter cited as J. BARRETT &
E. SEAGO). While basically the Act is founded upon the aggregate theory, it does include
some aspects of the entity theory. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-2(5), 50-8(3) and 50-9(1)
(Repl. vol. 1972).
"5VA. CODE ANN. § 50-6 (Repl. vol. 1972).
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and D, and for the latter to be able to transfer good title to realty origi-
nally acquired by the first partnership there must be some evidence that
title has been transferred from the first partnership to the second. While
the assignment of a partner's interest does not of itself dissolve the part-
nership," there can be no question that a technical dissolution occurs
whenever there is a change in the relation of the partners." One partner-
ship has dissolved and a new one has begun even though there has been
a continuation of the business without a liquidation of the partnership
affairs."' One of the practical problems in connection with the sale or
transfer of a general partner's interest in a partnership, therefore, con-
cerns the title to the property of the old partnership.7 While the transfer
of legal title to most partnership property from the dissolved partnership
to the partnership continuing the business may be accomplished by a
short bill of sale, or possibly by amendment to the partnership's agree-
ment and the certificate recorded in the partnership books, it is clear that
transfer of title to partnership real property to the new partnership is
necessary and can only be accomplished by deed.8" Another drawback to
"Id. § 50-27.
"Id. at 50-29.
7"VA. CODE ANN. § 50-41 (Repl. vol. 1972).
(1) When any new partner is admitted into an existing partnership, or
when any partner retires and assigns (or the representative of a deceased
partner assigns) his rights in partnership property to two or more of the
partners, or to one or more of the partners and one or more third persons,
if the business is continued without liquidation of the partnership affairs,
creditors of the first or dissolved partnership are also creditors of the
partnership so continuing the business.
Id. (Emphasis added). However, by statute the retirement, death or insanity (but not the
assignment of a general partner's interest to a new general partner) does not dissolve a
limited partnership if the business is continued as provided in the partnership certificate or
upon the consent of all partners. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-63 (Repl. vol. 1972).
11J. BARRETr & E. SEAGO, supra note 74, 340-41; for an interesting decision interpret-
ing the Virginia Uniform Partnership Act with regard to a partner's power to assign his
right in specific partnership property, see In re Decker, 295 F. Supp. 501 (W.D. Va. 1969).
"VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2 (Repl. vol. 1969). It is hornbook law that when a corporation
is a party to a merger or consolidation its property automatically passes to the surviving
corporation; the Virginia Code, however, recognizes that even in such a situation the chain
of title should be clearly reflected in the land records. In the merger or consolidation of
corporations, the Virginia Code specifically provides that all property including real prop-
erty belonging to or due each of the corporations so merged or consolidated, shall be taken
and deemed to be transferred to and vested in the surviving corporation without further act
or deed. Id. § 13.1-74(d) (Repl. vol. 1964). In further recognition that the title to real estate
is to be determined from the real estate records, the statute provides that whenever by
merger, consolidation or amendment to the articles of incorporation the name of any
corporation is changed or another corporation succeeded to the ownership of its property,
a certificate reciting such change or succession will be issued by the Clerk of the State
Corporation Commission which may be admitted to record in any recording office within
the jurisdiction of which the property of the corporation is located in order to maintain the
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the use of the general partnership or joint venture as a means of holding
title to real estate is that none of the participants are protected by limited
liability8'
Probably because it does provide limited liability" to some of the
participants as well as a degree of centralized management," the limited
partnership has for many years been the favorite vehicle of syndication.
In addition, this flexible device allows limited partners to transfer 4 freely
their partnership interests subject only to such restrictions as may be
provided in the partnership agreement, as evidenced by the recorded
certificate of limited partnership." So long as the guidelines set forth in
continuity of the title records. Id. § 13.1-127. In either event no tax is due. Further, the
statute adds that when the charter of a corporation is amended and the only effect is to
change the corporate name of the corporation that a deed conveying to such corporation
under its changed name all of its real property held immediately prior thereto shall be fifty
cents. Id. § 58-54 (Cum. Supp. 1972). No provision similar to those applicable to real estate
held by corporations appear among the partnership provisions.
"VA. CODE ANN. § 50-15 (Repl. vol. 1972). However, as a practical matter the risk
may be substantially reduced if the lender will agree to look solely to the property upon
which the debt is secured if sufficient insurance coverage is maintained; still investors shy
away from the exposure.
R2VA. CODE ANN. § 50-44 (Repl. vol. 1972). However, limited partners cannot partici-
pate in the control of the partnership business without risking loss of their limited liability.
Id. § 50-50. While he is not required to remain silent, Silvola v. Rowlet, 129 Colo. 52, 272
P.2d 287 (1954), Vulvan Furniture Mfg. Corp. v. Vaughn, 168 So. 2d 760, 764 (Fla. App.
1964), a limited partner's activities may lead him to be treated as a general partner with
respect to partnership liabilities. Filesi v. United States, 352 F.2d 339, 341 (4th Cir. 1965).
See generally Feld, The "'Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1471
(1969).
'Olnterestingly, the Kintner Regulations state that centralization of management exists
in an organization when ". . . any person (or any group of persons which does not include
all the members) has continuing exclusive authority to make the management decisions
necessary to the conduct of the business for which the organization was formed." Treas.
Regs. § 301.7701-2(c)(I) (1960). A limited partnership must include at least one general
and one limited partner, VA. CODE ANN. § 50-44 (Repl. vol. 1972); all of the rights and
powers of the partnership are vested in the general partners, Id. § 50-52, and a limited
partner is specifically excluded from participation in the management of partnership busi-
ness, Id. § 50-50; therefore, by definition, some group less than all of the members has the
continuing exclusive authority to manage the partnership's business. The Kintner Regula-
tions. however, provide that centralization of management does not generally exist in a
limited partnership unless substantially all the interests in the partnership are owned by the
limited partners. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (1960).
'"VA. CODE ANN. § 50-62 (Repl. vol. 1972). Some other advantages are that a limited
partner may not bind any other partner without their consent, and no technical dissolution
occurs upon the death of a limited partner. Id. § 50-64. Further, unlike a general partner-
ship, death of a general partner need not dissolve the partnership. Id. § 50-63. On the
negative side, the general partners are subject to personal liability, and the death of all
general partners dissolves the partnership. Id. § 50-44. Limited partners, moreover, should
not participate in control of the business. Id. § 50-50; see note 82 supra.
'VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-51, 62 (Repl. vol. 1972).
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the Kintner Regulations 6 are followed, there should be no danger of the
partnership being treated as an association taxable as a corporation.
While limited partnership interests may be transferred without changing
the character of the limited partnership, this is not so with regard to
changes of general partners. The one drawback from the utilization of the
limited partnership as a title holding device is the possible need to change
general partners, either to admit a new general partner or to transfer the
interest of one general partner to a new general partner.87 Here the same
chain of title problem arises as in the case of the general partnership.,,
The transfer of title to real estate would not be a problem if the
recording of a deed were not so expensive. In Virginia, however, the
recording tax is computed at a rate of fifteen cents on every hundred
dollars or fraction thereof on the fair market value of the property trans-
ferred, and an additional tax is imposed at the rate of fifty cents for each
five hundred dollars or fraction thereof." Recording taxes become a con-
uTreas. Reg. § 301.7701 (1960). See note 83 supra.
" A partnership with limited liability of some of the partners exists only because of the
authority of statute. The Virginia Limited Partnership Act, contains no statutory specifica-
tions as to acquisition, ownership and sales of real estate other than to provide that a limited
partnership may carry on any business which a general partnership may conduct except as
specified by statute. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-46 (Repl. vol. 1972). Presumably, and in actual
practice, the methods of execution of deeds by limited partnerships are the same as those
of general partnerships under the Virginia Partnership Act with the general, not the limited,
partners doing the executing.
"See note 80 supra. Some tax practitioners are apparently of the opinion that the same
rule that applies to limited partners, note 84 supra, also is applicable to general partners
and that, in checking the land records to determine who has authority to execute a deed
transferring title to realty held by a limited partnership, the title examiner need merely go
to the partnership books to determine the identity of the current general partners, and that
such persons may then sign a valid deed. Such a practice ignores the fact that a limited
partnership with A, B and C as general partners is different from a limited partnership with
A, B and D as general partners and that legal title to realty may only be transferred by
deed or will. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2 (1969). To the extent that the general partner of a
limited partnership is a corporation, the need to change general partners because of death
or disability might be avoided. The Service will treat such an arrangement as a partnership,
as opposed to an association taxable as a corporation, provided it passes the substance over
form requirements recently outlined in Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-2 CuM. BULL. 2, and it has
not more than two of the corporate attributes described in Treas. Reg. § 301.7701 (1960).
Since the Regulations state that a limited partnership organized under the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act lacks continuity of life, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1960), the required
tax status may be provided by making certain that the partnership lacks any one of the other
corporate attributes; usually this is accomplished by restricting transfer of limited partner-
ship interests. See generally Fraser, Taxing the Limited Partnership as a Corporation, 50
TAXES 333 (1972); Weiler, Limited Partnerships with Corporate General Partners: Beyond
Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972 J. TAX. 306.
"VA. CODE ANN. § 58-54.1 (Cum. Supp. 1972). Further, a county or city may impose
a recordation tax. Id. § 58-65.1. The tax mounts up quickly where the property is a
$3,000,000 shopping center or apartment complex. From a practical standpoint, this prob-
lem is probably avoided since title insurance companies are apparently willing to insure such
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sideration in those situations where title will be held for many years
during which it may reasonably be anticipated that there may be several
transfers of general partnership interests.
Real Estate Investment Trusts
When they can be used, Real Estate Investment Trusts," or REITs,
have the advantage over all other means of syndication of combining the
favorable corporate attributes of free transferability of interests, limited
liability, continuity of life and centralization of management while avoid-
ing tax at the trust or syndicate level. Investors in a REIT are able to
enjoy the same tax benefits as persons who invest in securities through
mutual funds. 1 However, while the REIT is an ideal vehicle for large
publicly owned and diversified syndicates ihe federal requirement that it
have at least one hundred beneficiaries" makes it unavailable for use in
small syndications, and therefore, outside the scope of this article.
titles provided they hold off record sufficient evidences, such as a duly executed deed signed
by all of the prior partners, which could be admitted to record if necessary. Such deed would
not initially be recorded because of the high recording taxes.
"aLike the land trust statute, the Virginia Real Estate Investment Trust Act, VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 6.1-343-51 (Repl. vol. 1966), was enacted by the General Assembly in 1962. The
Virginia REIT statute was adopted to make the federal REIT provisions, INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, §§ 856-58, enacted in 1960, available in Virginia.
11H.R. Rep. No. 2020, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1960). Because there is little or no
income tax at the entity level, REITs make it practicable for small investors to pool their
funds and thereby participate in large as well as diversified projects with the assistance of
expert investment counsel. This procedure had previously been initiated with regard to
stocks and securities through regulated investment companies, INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §§ 851-55, registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940. The federal tax
treatment of a REIT is similar to that of a mutual fund, it acts as a conduit for income
and capital gains. However, unlike a partnership there is no pass through of losses and the
REIT is denied the loss carry overs or carry backs available to corporations.
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(3). Some of the other requirements are that the
REIT be an unincorporated trust or association, Id. § 856(a) which, except for the REIT
provisions would be taxed as a corporation, Id. § 856(a)(3); that it be managed by one or
more trustees, id. § 856(a)(1) (REITs formed in Virginia must have a minimum of two
trustees a majority of whom are residents of Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6.1-349(2) and
344(I)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1972)); have, its ownership evidenced by transferable shares, INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(2), not be a personal holding company, id.. § 856(a)(6) and
not hold property primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its trade or
business, id. § 856(a)(4). In order to qualify for favorable treatment for a taxable year the
REIT must meet certain gross income and diversification of investment requirements: it
must distribute 90 percent of its ordinary income after deduction of allowable expenses,
id. § 957(a)(1); at least 90 percent of the REIT's gross income must be derived from
dividends, interest, rents from real property, gain from sales or other dispositions of stock,
securities and real estate, id. § 856(c)(2); and 75 percent must come from passive real estate
investments, id. § 856(c)(3). The REITs' gross income from short term capital gains on
stock or securities and its gain from the sale of real property held for less than four years
may not exceed 30 percent of the REIT's gross income. See generally Symposium-Real
Estate Investment Trusts, 48 VA. L. REV. 1007 (1962).
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5. Tax Considerations
In the utilization of a land trust as in the setting up of any real estate
syndication, no matter the type of title holding entity, serious considera-
tion must be given to the problem of whether what is created will be
considered as an association taxable as a corporation under federal in-
come tax laws.
In 1937, in A.A. Lewis & Co. v. Commissioner,93 the United States
Supreme Court held that an Illinois subdivision land trust was not taxable
as an association. Vacant land was conveyed to a trustee to hold for the
benefit of the grantor and Lewis, who was the exclusive sales agent and
manager of the trust. The trustee had the duties of executing conveyances
upon the agents' directions and collecting and disbursing the payments
made by the contract purchases in order to facilitate the subdivision and
the sale of the realty. The Court held that the trust answered the descrip-
tion of an ordinary trust in that it was created by virtue of a declaration
by which a designated piece of real property was conveyed to the trustee
on specific trusts for the benefit of definitely named persons. The duties
of the trustees were found to be purely ministerial; there was nothing
analogous to a corporate organization. Since the duties of the trustee
under such a subdivision trust are broader and more extensive than under
the normal land trust, it should follow that the decision in Lewis exempts
such trusts from taxability as associations. In an earlier case decided by
the Seventh Circuit, Commissioner v. McCormack,94 title to the Chicago
Stock Exchange building was placed in a land trust, management was
vested exclusively in the agent of the beneficiaries, and the duty of the
trustees was solely to hold title. The court held that the trust was not
taxable as an association.
Through the Kintner Regulations, 5 the Internal Revenue Service has
removed much of the confusion which previously existed by setting forth
the guidelines which it will utilize in determining whether a trust, partner-
ship or limited partnership, or other association will be taxed as a corpo-
ration. The characteristics are (1) associates, (2) an objective to carry on
business and divide the gains therefrom, (3) continuity of life, (4) centrali-
zation of management, (5) limited liability, and (6) freely transferable
interests; the last four attributes are considered to be corporate character-
istics. Any organization having more than half of the corporate character-
istics will be treated as an association taxable as a corporation for federal
income tax purposes.
More recently the Service ruled for the purposes of determining the
appropriate treatment for purposes of the Self-Employment Contribu-
9 30 1 U.S. 385 (1937).
'168 F.2d 653 (7th Cir. 1934).
"Treas. Regs. §§ 301.7701-02 (1960).
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tions Act that where the arrangement encompassed the holding of legal
title to real estate by a trustee with management, control, and operation
of the property vested in the beneficiaries, that the organization was
properly classified as a joint venture or a partnership for federal income
and self-employment tax purposes. The Service applied the rules of sec-
tion 301.7701 of the regulations on procedure and administration in order
to determine whether the arrangement should be classified for federal tax
purposes as a partnership, corporation or trust. Under the specific facts
set forth in the Ruling, the Internal Revenue Service found that the land
trust had two corporate characteristics, free transferability of interests
and continuity of life, but did not have the corporate characteristics of
centralization of management and limited liability; therefore it did not
have more corporate characteristics than non-corporate characteristics."6
A trustee of a land trust is required to file with the Internal Revenue
Service a notice of fiduciary relationship with respect to each beneficiary
under the land trust whether the beneficiary is designated in the original
instrument creating the trust or secures his interest by assignment from
another. 7 However, since the trustee normally never physically receives
any of the rents, issues or profits, he need not file any fiduciary income
tax returns and in fact cannot since he has no income and makes no
distributions to the beneficiaries. In addition, while the grantor retains the
power to revest title to any part of the corpus of the trust, either alone
or together with any person. not having a substantial adverse interest in
the disposition of the corpus or the income therefrom, the income of the
trust shall be included in computing the net income of the grantor."8
For the purposes of Virginia income taxes, it appears that the term
"corporation" would not apply to land trusts.9 The fiduciary income tax
provisions would also not appear to be applicable so long as the trustee
does not receive any of the income from the property. 10
"See Rev. Rul. 64-220, 1964-2 CUM. BULL. 335.
"[NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6903; Rev. Rul. 63-16, 1963-1 CUM. BULL. 350; Note,
Internal Revenue Rules 63-16, Effect on Non-disclosure of Land Trusts, 59 Nw. U.L. REV.
98 (1964).
" NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 671-678. Moreover, partnerships as such are not subject
to federal income tax, although they must file returns of income under the provisions of
section 6031 and the regulations thereunder. Thereafter, each partner's distributive share
of income, gain, loss, deduction, depreciation or credit will generally be determined by the
partnership agreement. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, § 704(a).
"Prior Virginia Law, VA. CODE ANN. § 58-77(2) (1966), treated as corporations for
the purpose of the Virginia corporate income tax ". . . associations and all enterprises
operated by trustees . . .[where] the interest in . . .[the organization was] evidenced by
shares of stock, whether with or without par, face or nominal value." The new Virginia
income tax law adopts almost verbatim the federal definition of a corporation; compare VA.
CODE ANN. § 58-151.02(d) (Cum. Supp. 1972) with INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 7701(a)(3). It would appear, therefore, that Virginia will follow the federal government's
lead and be guided by its regulations and rulings.
'0"VA. CODE ANN. § 58-151.02(c) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
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Conclusion
The land trust, if properly utilized, is an attractive alternative for
handling syndications in Virginia for the purpose of holding title to real
estate. This is true whether the real estate held in the trust represents a
speculative venture or is a business investment, such as a shopping center,
or is part of a large estate in which the owner desires to distribute interests
among various members of his family. These objectives can be accom-
plished through the utilization of both a land trust and a limited partner-
ship. Title to the real property might be placed in a land trust, and the
beneficial interest in the trust would then be transferred to and held by a
limited partnership. Under the terms of the assignment, the land trust
trustee would then look only to the general partners of the limited part-
nership for directions. By using this combination of devices, there is no
question of the marketability of the title to the real property, and inves-
tors are able to continue dealing with a device with which they have
become familiar. Assignments of limited partnership interests would not
need to be communicated to the trustee since such transfers, by statute,
do not change the partnership. Changes, however, of general partnership
interests would require that the beneficial interest be transferred from the
old partnership to the new partnership. Such an assignment, however,
would only require a simple instrument directed to the trustee; no deed
would be necessary, and hence there would be no question of recording
cost expenses.
While benefits of the utilization of a limited partnership with a land
trust for syndication purposes is obvious, this combination may be just
as helpful in income tax as well as gift and estate planning. Individuals
owning a large income producing property may wish to shift some of the
income to children or grandchildren. This may be accomplished by plac-
ing title to the property in a land trust and forming a general or preferably
a limited partnership for the purpose of holding the beneficial interest.
Limited partnership interests may then be given to the various beneficiar-
ies and be added to annually in order to avoid unnecessary gift taxes.
Such transfers might also accomplish estate planning objectives and facil-
itate the eventual sale of the property since the general partners would
be able to direct the trustee as to sale; the proceeds would then be distrib-
uted pro rata among all partners in accordance with their interests in the
partnership.
Since the advantages of the land trust appear to be so apparent, one
wonders why its development in Virginia as well as elsewhere has been
so slow. One observation is the natural inertia of attorneys against adopt-
ing a new device. Another is that banks and trust companies in Virginia
generally have not publicized the advantages because the laid trust de-
creases the volume of business accruing to attorneys, real estate brokers
and title insurance companies. Another possible reason is that until there
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have been some Virginia decisions confirming that the interest of benefici-
aries under a land trust is personalty, there may remain some doubt in
skeptical minds. As was mentioned previously, this doubt could easily be
removed by amending the land trust statute to include a provision similar
to that included in the Florida statute.' Currently the problem may be
overcome by utilizing a limited partnership to hold the beneficial interests
since the legal interest of a partner in partnership property is personalty,
no matter how it may be characterized in the particular land trust.
Finally, while land trust printed blank forms may be easily obtainable,
it is extremely important that those interested in land trusts realize that
this device is something more than merely the proper filling in of printed
blank forms. Each trust agreement, as well as the deed in trust, must be
designed for its particular situation; the drafter, just as in the case of
limited partnerships or any other means of syndication, must design the
land trust so as to carry out the desires and objectives of the beneficiaries.
Further, he must take special pains to insure that he does not stray
outside the guidelines set forth in the Kintner Regulations. Eventually,
as the legal and practical advantages as well as the limitations of land
trusts become more widely understood and appreciated, its proper use
will increase.
'0See note 44 supra.
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